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This paper explores, both formally and empirically, the political accountability mechanisms that
lie behind the varying levels of public corruption and of effective governance taking place across
nations. The first section develops a principal-agent model in which good governance is a
function of the extent to which citizens can hold political officials accountable for their actions.
Although policy-makers may have strong incentives to appropriate parts of the citizens’ income,
well-designed institutions (those increasing both informational flows and elite competitiveness)
boost political accountability and reduce the space left for the appropriation of rents. The
following sections of the paper test the model.  The presence of democratic mechanisms of
control and an increasingly informed electorate, measured through the frequency of newspaper
readership, explain considerably well the distribution of corrupt practices and governmental
ineffectiveness in three types of data sets: a large cross-section of countries in the late 1990s for
which an extensive battery of governance indicators has been recently developed by Kaufmann
et al. (1999a); a panel data set for the period 1980-95 and about 100 nations on corruption and
bureaucratic quality based on experts’ rankings; and corruption data for the cross-section of US
states in the period 1977-95.
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Introduction
Although the number of democratic regimes, and thus the use of proper constitutional
mechanisms to make politicians accountable to citizens, have expanded substantially in the last
decades, corruption among public officials and, more generally, malfunctioning governments
remain widespread phenomena across the globe. Unfortunately, this failure to create good
governing institutions has dramatic economic and political consequences.  On the one hand,
growth and, in broader terms, the welfare of citizens have been shown to be enhanced by well-
functioning governments, that is, governments that abide by the rule of law, whose bureaucrats
and policymakers are not affected by graft practices, and whose administrative machinery
delivers goods and services in an efficient manner (Easterly and Levine, 1997; Kaufmann et al.,
1999a; Knack and  Keefer, 1995; Mauro, 1995). On the other hand, for those regimes with
elected governments, the presence of political corruption and administrative inefficiency point to
a fundamental break in the basis of what should be formally considered representative
democracies.
In contrast to the mounting scholarly research on the consequences of good governance,
our knowledge about what causes governments to be clean and efficient is still in its infancy.
The current literature has alternatively embraced pre-existing economic conditions, broad
cultural patterns, the existence of a particular cooperative milieu among social agents and certain
constitutional frameworks as the causes that lie behind good governance. For those researchers
who stress the role of the economy, well-performing public institutions are the result of having
enough physical and human assets to enable policy-makers to fund and manage in an effective
manner comprehensive policies and modern administrative agencies. Cultural theorists
emphasize instead the set of normative bonds in which political action is embedded. Effective
and uncorrupted governments only arise whenever public civicness or certain ethical beliefs
constitute a dominant value in the political community. More recently, good governance has
been related to the existence of social capital, that is, the presence of institutionalized norms of
reciprocity and trust, enough to empower citizens to overcome potential collective action
problems. Finally, and in direct correspondence with the Federalist debates of two centuries ago,
for the  neoinstitutionalist strand of political science good constitutional engineering should
eventually generate the conditions for effective governance. Matching this oversupply of6
theoretical models, the current empirical work is still inconclusive.
1 More importantly, the
prevailing theories of political corruption and governmental performance have hardly fleshed out
the micro-mechanisms through which policy-makers comply or, more exactly, are made to
comply with the law and behave in a benevolent fashion.
Accordingly, to account for varying levels of public corruption and of effective
governmental governance across nations, this paper develops, in its first section, a principal-
agent model in which good governance is a function of the extent to which citizens can hold
political officials accountable for their actions. In a world in which the actions of a policymaker
(as well their consequences) are only partly observable to citizens, the former can be shown to
have strong incentives to appropriate parts of the latter’s income. Rent-seeking behavior,
however, is conditional on the information citizens have over both the state of the world and the
policy-maker’s decisions. As information goes up, political accountability rises, and the space
left for the appropriation of rents declines. The following two sections of the paper test the
model. In Section 2 we show that both the presence of democratic mechanisms of control and an
increasingly informed electorate, measured through the frequency of newspaper readership,
explain considerably well the distribution of corrupt practices and governmental ineffectiveness
across a world sample. In Section 3 we extend these results to the universe of U.S. states. Section
4 concludes.
1.  A Theory of Political Accountability
To develop a theory of the causes of political corruption (and, more generally, of good
governance), we explore the institutional and informational conditions under which the public
can induce policymakers and bureaucrats to behave well.
Following the most recent literature on the sources of political accountability, we can
conceive of the machinery of government as a game in which a principal, the public, delegates
on an agent, the policy-maker, a given set of instruments to execute certain goals (Przeworski,
Stokes and Manin, 1999). This delegation process is not exempted, however, from considerable
political tensions due to the existence of both heterogeneous interests and informational
asymmetries between the principal and the agent. First, policymakers and voters may have
                                                       
1 Most studies on corruption are focused on case studies. Exceptions to this trend are Treisman (1998) and La Porta
et al. (1998), who use a worldwide sample. Putnam (1993) explores the broader issue of governance for the universe7
interests at odds with each other: the former may be simply interested in enriching themselves
while in office; or, even if they are honest, their ideas about what enhances the welfare of the
public may differ from what the public itself wants. Second, the principal and agents may differ
in their corresponding levels of information about the state of the world, the policies to be
pursued and their welfare consequences. If the public is less well informed than the policy-
maker, the latter can more easily impose her preferences or even exploit the public. In short, the
delegation of decision-making and policy implementation responsibilities, a “must” in modern
representative democracies, automatically opens up the possibility for significant inefficiencies
and corruption among political practitioners.
As shown in the seminal papers of Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986), the solution to the
delegation problem lies in the public setting up a control mechanism, such as regular elections, to
discipline the policy-maker. If electors vote retrospectively, that is, if they look backwards to the
results provided by the incumbent before casting their ballot, elections should make
policymakers accountable to the public. Being dependent on electors’ support, politicians would
strive to deliver good services and refrain from extracting rents. Yet that solution may be only
partial. As we show formally below, the effectiveness of any control mechanism depends both on
the instruments that the public has to collect information on the behavior of the government and
on the ease with which the control device can be exercised.
To model the relationship between policymakers and citizens and to explore the
mechanisms through which political accountability and good government take place, we use a
principal-agent model developed in Persson and Tabellini (2000). We extend it to allow for
variation in both the extent of information citizens have and on the type of political regime
(democratic or authoritarian) in place.
Agents and budget constraint. In the model we consider the incumbent politician’s
single-period payoff as:
U
P = ? r + P  (1)
where r are the rents she is able to extract in the period, reduced by the transaction costs of
appropriating them (0<? <1), and P are the perks she gets from being in the government, such as
recognition, nice cars, good restaurants and so on.
                                                                                                                                                                                  
of Italian regions. These studies also include systematic reviews of the existing theoretical literature.8
Income does not vary among individuals. Moreover, government spending cannot be
targeted to any specific group. As a result, there are N voters with identical preferences, that is,
with the following utility function:
U
V= c + H(g) = y - t  + H(g)                   (2)
where c denotes consumption, y income, t taxes, g a public good and H(.) is a concave and
increasing function.
In that setting, the government budget constraint is given by:
? g = N t - r                                             (3)
where ?e [?L, ?H] is a random variable, with a well defined density s(.) and distribution S(.)
functions, that denotes the cost of producing public goods.
Complete information. In the absence of information or moral hazard problems, rents
should be zero, r=0, and the public goods provision by a benevolent dictator should follow the
Samuelson criteria:
N Hg(g)=?                                                 (4)
As a result, the optimal g would be defined by an decreasing function G(? ), and the
optimal tax would be set at t =T(? )=? G(?)/N. This policy will be unanimously endorsed by the
citizens.
Incomplete or no information. A more plausible scenario, however, is one in which the
principal, that is, citizens, cannot fully observe either the state of the world or the actions (and
their consequences) of policymakers. To understand how citizens may discipline the
policymaker, consider the following game.
First, the state of the economy ? is realized. Whereas the policy-maker fully observes it,
the degree of information that voters have may be incomplete. In the most extreme case, that is,
in a situation in which voters have no information about the state of the economy and/or life in
the presidential palace, they can only use the unconditional distribution of  ?  to make their
inferences, that is,  S(.), to vote. More plausibly, over time voters obtain some information,
through news media, personal networks or their own direct experiences, about the realization of
?, which they will use to update their beliefs about the distribution of ? in that particular period.
As voters gather more relevant information, they obtain a conditional distribution of the
realization of ? that has a smaller support than s(.) and, consequently, a lower variance. (If the
information is complete, of course, they perfectly observe the realized state of nature with no9
uncertainty.) We define  S(.) and  s(.)  as the conditional cumulative distribution and density
functions of ? that voters use each period. These functions vary each period depending both on
the particular realization of ? and on the information that voters have.
Second, with that information about the state of the world, citizens set their reservation
utility level Û
V, that is, a minimal performance standard, such as a given unemployment rate or a
certain speed in issuing drivers’ licenses, to evaluate the incumbent. If the standard is met,
citizens support the incumbent—independently of the real effort made by the policymaker.
Conversely, whenever that standard is not attained, citizens shift to the opposition candidate. In
short, citizens simply behave using a retrospective voting rule, in which ex-ante all politicians
are considered to have similar preferences and abilities. Formally, their support rule will be:
p
I = 1 if W(? ) y - t  + H(g)  Û
V  (5)
p
I = 0 otherwise (6)
where p
I is the probability of supporting the incumbent.
Citizens only re-extend their support to the incumbent if the utility level they derive from
public policy in state  ?  exceeds a certain cutoff point  Û
V. Now, how strict that evaluation
yardstick will be varies with the beliefs that citizens have about the state of the world and about
the efficacy of the instruments at the hands of the policy-maker. Notice that standard models of
political accountability always assume a competitive democratic system in which voters hold
policymakers accountable through elections. Here, however, we cast our net wider: we substitute
citizens and support for voters and ballots. The goal is to extend the idea of political
accountability through the more generic concept of support to examine how political control (and
good government) fare under both democratic and non-democratic regimes. Even the most cruel
dictatorships require some level of support (at least among sympathizers) to sustain themselves
over time. With support related to some minimal performance, whenever that performance is not
met, the regime should fall. Naturally, the higher cost of overthrowing a dictatorship (compared
with kicking out the incumbent through elections) reduces the relative price of the goods the
regime should deliver to avoid a revolution. As a result, mismanagement and corruption should
be much higher under authoritarian regimes than democracies, other things being equal. The
possibility of different types of regimes (with very different support thresholds) is formally
modeled below.10
Knowing the state of the world, the information citizens have, and the retrospective rule
they have chosen, the policymaker may embrace two alternative policies. She may please the
voters, giving them a policy that satisfies (5) and that secures her reelection. In this case, that is,
in securing reelection, the total payoff for the incumbent will be ?r* + P + ßO
I, where r* are the
minimal rents politicians get, P the perks, ß the discounting factor and O
 I the present discounted
utility of being in office in the next period. Alternatively, the incumbent may decide to behave
myopically and maximize short-term rents, setting t =d y and obtaining r=d Ny. This will allow
her to secure ?d N y + P + ßO
O.
2 The parameter O
O represents the present discounted utility of
being out of office in the next period.
3 The parameter d (0 d 1) captures the difficulty with which
politicians may appropriate citizens’ income. It declines to 0 as the appropriation of the income y
becomes more difficult. Accordingly, as  d  drops, the incentive politicians have to behave
myopically decline and the probability of having good policies go up.
There are two main factors that make the appropriation (or confiscation) of the national
income harder for politicians, that is, that lead to a fall of the parameter d. First, d declines with
an increase in the regular use of democratic procedures to elect public officials. Overthrowing an
incumbent through a revolution or mass protests rather than through regularly contested elections
is much more costly to citizens, due to the risks associated with the violence, the problems of
coordinating high numbers of protesters, etc. In other words, in authoritarian regimes, where the
price of making politicians accountable is much higher, politicians would be more likely to
maximize short-term rents. Corruption and mismanagement should be much higher in
dictatorships.
4  Second,  d varies with the economic structure in place for two reasons: it
decreases as the specificity of assets (that generate y) falls; and it also falls as the economic
resources become more diversified. As assets become less specific, that is, as the cost of putting
them to alternative uses declines, their owners can more easily escape the brunt of self-interested
policy-makers. Anticipating the exit option of asset owners, which makes the possibility of
appropriating income more difficult to politicians, policymakers will be more inclined to follow
                                                       
2 Alternatively, we may consider that the ability to confiscate only extends to that amount of revenue that the voters
may consider ex-ante reasonable for any potential realization of the state of nature, given their information. This will
of course reduce the size of rents.
3 In an a complete intertemporal model, O
I and O
O would be determined by the model (see Persson, Roland and
Tabellini, 1997). For simplicity of the exposition here, we consider them as given.
4 Another way to reduce d may consist of designing constitutional structures that increase the costs of appropriating
income. This would the case of a separation-of-powers system or a federal structure: with several politicians in
charge, the ability of just one of them appropriating the whole national income diminishes substantially.11
the first political strategy, which consists on providing the level of public goods expected by
citizens. Similarly, as the economy becomes more diversified, that is, as it moves from producing
only one product, say oil, to having many economic sectors, the cost of appropriating rents by
the state is likely to increase. In short, as asset specificity and economic concentration decline,
governmental performance should improve.
Voters may always have to cope with a minimum amount of rents (for any state of
nature) depending on the parameters of the model. Minimum rents will be determined by




I  =? d N y + P +ßO 
O (7)
Defining O =( ß O 
I - ßO
O), the policy-maker’s minimal rents will be given by:
r* = max (0, dNy - O /? ) (8)
As the public recognition of the job goes up (and the satisfaction this brings to the
politician increases, that is,  P increases), O and O
I go up and the minimum rents decrease.
Similarly, as d declines, due to more democratic mechanisms, more mobile assets or a more
diversified economy, minimum rents also decline.
Using both the government constraint (3) to substitute for  t and expression (8) to
substitute for y, we can rewrite the voter’s utility as:
(9)
where rX is any additional rent beyond the minimum that the politician can seize.
5
We know that because voters cannot observe the true state of nature, they choose a
reservation utility Û
V using the information they have on the distribution of ?, that is, the cost of
producing public goods. The higher Û
V, the more likely the politician will act myopically.  Note
that each level of reservation utility Û
V implies a threshold value ? 
*. If the real cost of producing
public goods is above this threshold value, that is, if ? > ?
 *, the politician will choose to seize
the maximum amount of income possible, setting t = dy and obtaining r = dNy. She immediately
sees that since she cannot satisfy the expectations of voters, she will be defeated in the election.
Conversely, if the real costs of production are below the voter’s threshold, that is, ? < ? 
*, the
                                                       








V x = - + - - + ( ) ( ) 1 d
g
q W12
politician will just satisfy the re-election constraint. The politician will set g equal to G(? *) and
will collect the minimum rent r
* plus an additional rent, rx = G(? *) (? * -?  ), due to the cost
difference of providing the public good under the realized state and under 
*.
Using the last expression, we can rewrite the voter’s utility level as follows:
                                                      (10)
Voters will choose the best reservation utility  Û
V given their information about the
distribution of the state of nature S ( ?). The expected utility is given by:
                                                                                                   (11)
where ? = ?L and q £  ?H are the bounds of the function  s(.). As a result the optimal
threshold value ? 
* is given by:
(12)
In each period, voters expect a certain rent to be seized, on average, by the politician:
(13)
This can be rewritten as:
  (14)
where
From (14) it is easy to see that the expected size of rents for the policy-maker declines as
voters gather better information. With increasing levels of information, the probability that voters
undervalue the costs of generating public goods will decline. This in turn will depress the policy-
makers’ incentives to appropriate rents than exceed the minimal ones.
In the limit, as the variance of the distribution of ?  the voters use shrinks toward zero, (?
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that is, E(r) =  dNy - O / ?
6  With voters having perfect information about the state of nature in
the period, they would still set Û
V at the optimal level implied by that particular realization, once
minimum rents for politicians had been taken into account. Whenever d=0, either because certain
very transparent democratic mechanisms are imposed or because assets are completely mobile,
no rents will be appropriated at all—that case would be identical to having a benevolent dictator
(that is, a policymaker unconcerned with rents or perks).
2.  Governance and Corruption in the World
To explore the impact of democracy and informational mechanisms on political accountability
across nations, we use two types of indicators in this section. In its first part, we employ the
recent indices of quality of government developed by  Kaufmann, Kraay and  Zoido-Lobatón
(1999a and 1999b) for a cross-section of nations in the mid-1990s. We then extend our analysis
to a time-series cross-sectional analysis of corruption and other governance indicators that are
available since the early 1980s.
2.1. Political Governance in the Late 1990s
Dependent variable. Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobatón (1999a and 1999b) have recently
provided new comprehensive indicators of the quality of government for a cross-section of
between 155 and 173 countries for 1997-98.  In these studies the quality of governance is
measured along three dimensions: “(1) the process by which governments are selected,
monitored and replaced; (2) the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and
implement sound policies; and (3) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that
govern economic and social interactions among them” (Kaufmann et al., 1999a: 1).
To measure these dimensions, the authors employ data drawn from both polls of experts
which reflect country ratings (on a global or regional basis) and cross-country surveys of firms or
citizens carried out by international and non-governmental organizations. All the available
indicators are grouped into six clusters, two for each of the three dimensions. The processes by
which governments are selected and replaced are summarized by indicators grouped in the
clusters labeled “Voice and Accountability,” which measures the ability of citizens to participate
in the selection of governments, and “Political Instability and Violence,” which indicates the
                                                       
6 Notice that, even if the size of the expected rents shrinks smoothly as more information becomes available, the14
likelihood that governments could be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or other
violent means. The capacity of the state to implement sound policies is captured by clusters
referred to as “Government Effectiveness” and “Regulatory Burden.” The former combines
perceptions of the quality of public services and bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants,
the independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the
government’s commitment to policies. The latter includes measures of distortionary policies,
such as price controls or inadequate bank supervision, as well as perceptions of the burdens due
to excessive regulations in areas such as foreign trade and business development. The two
clusters called “Rule of Law” and “Graft” capture the respect of citizens and the state for the
rules which govern their interactions. The index on the “Rule of Law” is based on measures on
the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society; it includes
perceptions about the incidence of crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary,
and the enforceability of contracts. Finally, “Graft” provides an indicator of subjective
perceptions of public corruption.
The aggregate indicators for each cluster were estimated by means of an unobserved
components model which expresses the observed data in each cluster as a linear function of the
unobserved common component of governance, plus a disturbance term capturing perception
errors and/or sampling variation in each indicator.
7
To measure government quality we have used the aggregate indicators for Graft, the Rule
of Law, Regulatory Burden, and Government Effectiveness, as well as an Overall Indicator of
Government Quality which is estimated from these four indicators using the principal
components method. The index of overall quality has a mean of about 0, varies from a minimum
of -4.6 to a maximum of 4.5, and has a standard deviation of 1.86. The separate indexes have a
mean around 0 and a standard deviation of 0.9 and generally vary from -1.5 to 2.
Model and independent variables. To estimate the causes of variation in government
effectiveness, we estimate the following OLS regression model in a cross-section of nations:
Quality of  Governmentt =  a+a1  Democracyt+a2  Informational  Mechanismst + a3
Democracyt * Informational Mechanismst + a4 Control Variablest + e t.
                                                                                                                                                                                  
range for the actual size of the rent still supports the state of partial or complete confiscation.
7 For the estimation procedure, see Kaufmann et al. (1999b).15
The variables employed are:
(1) “Level of Democracy” in 1994, taken from the Polity III database developed by
Jaggers and Gurr (1995), and  rescaled as a variable from 0 to 1.
8 If our discussion on the
mechanisms that create political accountability is right, a democratic regime should bolster good
governance.
(2) The “Circulation of Daily Newspapers” per person in 1995 to measure the quality of
informational controls. The data comes from the World Bank, World Development Indicators,
which draws the figures from UNESCO.
(3) The interactive term “Level of Democracy * Circulation of Newspapers,” which
should gauge the extent to which newspaper readership generates real political accountability
only under conditions of political freedom. Massive levels of readership without political
liberties, like in the former Soviet Union, resulted from a strongly mobilized (or a highly
controlled) electorate but they clearly did not make the Politburo any more accountable to the
public.
(4) The following stack of control variables is also introduced to test the robustness of
our measures:
(a) The log of “Per Capita Income” to measure the impact of economic development. The
data correspond to 1990 and are expressed in 1987 constant dollars. They come from the World
Bank. We have also controlled for educational levels through both mean years of schooling and
the sum of primary, secondary and tertiary enrollment rates.
(b) The level of “Political Instability,” measured through Kaufmann’s Political Instability
and Violence Index in 1997-98. The level of political instability approximates the likelihood that,
given the conditions independent of her actions, the incumbent will remain in office in the future.
Accordingly, we should expect that, other things being equal, as political instability increases,
the incumbent has a higher incentive to appropriate maximum rents in the present period. In
other words, corruption and inefficient policies should rise with instability.
(c) Percentage of the population of each country that belonged to the three most
widespread religions (Catholicism, Islam, and Protestantism), using the data reported in La Porta
                                                       
8 Democracy is there defined as having three essential elements: (1) the presence of institutions and procedures
through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative political policies and leaders; (2) the
existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of executive power; and (3) the guarantee of civil liberties16
et al. (1998). These three measures of religious beliefs and practices tap the cultural and ethical
norms that may influence the behavior of politicians in office. If we are to believe LaPorta et al.
(1998), Protestant countries should exhibit, in typical Weberian fashion, better governmental
performance due to higher ethical standards, widespread literacy and non-hierarchical structures
of social interaction.
(d) Type of legal code, which LaPorta et al. (1998) consider relevant to understand the
type of incentives that constrain policymakers in each country. According to this study, whereas
common law systems developed to defend parliament and property owners from the sovereign’s
attempts to regulate and expropriate them, civil law systems were established as instruments for
state building and to control the economy. We use here a measure from La Porta et al. (1998)
that considers whether the Company Law or Commercial Code of the country comes from: (1)
English Common Law; (2) French Commercial Code; (3) German Commercial Code; (4)
Scandinavian Commercial Code; or (5) Socialist/Communist laws.
(e) Ethnic fractionalization, measured through an index built by LaPorta et al. (1998) by
averaging five different sources in Easterly and Levine (1997).
(f) Constitutional framework. We consider three types of political institutions: (i) the use
or not of a proportional representation electoral system (coded through a dummy variable); (ii)
the existence of a federal arrangement (also measured through a dichotomous variable); and (iii)
the relationship between the executive and legislative branches through a variable that takes the
values of 0 if the president is elected directly, 1 if the president is elected by the assembly but has
substantial powers and 2 if the system is purely parliamentarian. The first variable has been built
based on Cox (1997), IDEA (1997), Linz and Valenzuela (1994), Shugart and Carey (1992) and
Keesing’s Record of World Events (formerly Keesing’s Contemporary Archives). The variable on
federalism follows Downes (2000). The latter variable is taken from the Harvard Center for
International Development Political data set. The literature is split on the effects these variables
may have on governance. Researchers have alternatively claimed that proportional representation
reduces rent-seeking behavior (Rogowski, 1987) and enhances patronage relationships and
hinder governmental responsiveness. Similarly, while some see federal systems and separation-
of-powers systems as disciplining devices that sharpen the extent of potential conflict among
                                                                                                                                                                                  
to all citizens.  In fact, however, given the absence of data on civil liberties, their measure of democracy is built from
the subjective coding of the first two elements.17
politicians and therefore reduce the level of rents (Persson and Tabellini, 2000), for others a
multiplication of veto points simply generates wasteful and inefficient policies.
(g) To measure the political mobilization of the electorate, we control for voter turnout,
alone and jointly with democratic regime. Higher levels of electoral mobilization should increase
the responsiveness of politicians and improve the quality of government—particularly in
democratic settings. The variable “turnout,” taken from IDEA (1997), is defined as the
proportion of those voting out of all those citizens above the legal voting age. It is calculated as
the average of the elections taking place in the decade previous to 1997.
(h) The size of government, measured as proportion of public revenues of the central
government over GDP. The sign of the variable may go in either direction. On the one hand,
larger governments may imply higher public wages and hence both lower incentives to accept
bribes among civil servants and better public services. On the other hand, a bigger state may
signal more opportunities for corruption and inefficiencies.
(i) The log value of the ratio of trade (sum of imports and exports) to GDP and the
proportion of capital controls to measure the degree of economic openness. A higher degree of
economic openness may again operate in opposite directions. Although higher levels of
internationalization may discipline politicians into delivering better services to attract foreign
investors, they could also open up the space for corruption and rent-extraction. Data on exports
and imports comes from the World Bank. The presence of capital controls is based on Quinn’s
financial liberalization index of government restrictions on international capital movements
(based on the IMF’s coding in Quinn, 1997), normalized to a range from 0 to 1. A higher number
implies fewer capital controls.
(j) Finally, the presence of “cooperative” practices or arrangements in the population, that
is, the level of social capital, which has recently been hailed as a fundamental mechanism to
explain good government (Putnam, 1993, 2000). Although it is often bundled together with
“newspaper readership” and “turnout,” we have decided to measure it separately through the
level of “interpersonal trust” (as measured in the World Value Surveys). One of the purposes of
this paper is to determine through which precise mechanisms do efficient and clean government
occur—a question that has not yet been well solved in the literature on social capital (Boix and
Posner, 1998).18
Results. Tables 1 through 4 present the results for the indicators of Overall Quality,
Government Efficiency, Graft and Rule of Law, respectively.  In each table we report three
models: the first one includes newspaper readership and two control variables, economic
development and political instability, that are very stable and highly significant from a statistical
point of view; the second model adds the level of democracy; the third model includes as well
the interactive term of democracy and newspaper readership.
Results for Regulatory Burden are not reported. Unsurprisingly, newspaper readership
(alone or jointly with democracy) has no impact on the level of regulations in each country.
Newspaper readership is clearly tapping the ability citizens have to control public institutions.
Yet it says nothing about the level of state intervention (through policy regulations) citizens
demand from their politicians.19
TABLE 1
The Overall Quality of Governments across the World
OVERALL QUALITY
INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES   (1)   (2) (3)
Constant -2.23*** -2.43*** -2.42***
(0.62) (0.66) (0.66)
Circulation of Newspapers 
a  1.70**  1.17^ -0.36^
(0.83) (0.96) (1.87)
                                                  
Level of Democracy 
b  0.57**  0.43^
(0.25) (0.29)
Circulation of Newspapers  1.75^
* Level of Democracy (1.85)
Per Capita Income  0.30***  0.29***  0.30***
(Log) 
c (0.09) (0.10) (0.10)
Political Instability
 d  1.20***  1.14***  1.14***
             (0.11)  (0.12) (0.12)
                                                  
R-Squared 0.798 0.806  0.807
Ajusted R-Squared 0.793 0.799  0.799
Number of observations 126 117  117
a Newspaper Circulation per Person.
b Gurr Index of Democracy, rescaled from 0 to 1.
c Per Capita Income. Log of per capita GDP in $ and 1985 constant prices. Source: World Penn Tables.
d Index of Political Stability from Kaufmann et al. (1999a). 
Estimation:  Ordinary last squares estimation.
Standard errors in parenthesis.
*** p<0.01; **p<0.05
^ In joint test with democratic institutions, statistically significant at 0.05 level.
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VARIABLES   (1)   (2) (3)
Constant -1.03*** -1.09*** -1.08***
(0.35) (0.37) (0.37)
Circulation of Newspapers 
a  0.89**  0.74^ -0.64^
(0.47) (0.54) (1.06)
                                                  
Level of Democracy 
b  0.23^  0.10^
(0.14) (0.16)
Circulation of Newspapers  1.59^
* Level of Democracy (1.04)
Per Capita Income  0.13***  0.13**  0.14**
(Log) 
c (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Political Instability 
 d  0.55***  0.53***  0.54***
             (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
                                                  
R-Squared 0.727 0.737 0.742
Ajusted R-Squared 0.720 0.728 0.731
Number of observations 126 117 117
a Newspaper Circulation per Person.
b Gurr Index of Democracy, rescaled from 0 to 1.
c Per Capita Income. Log of per capita GDP in $ and 1985 constant prices. Source: World Penn Tables.
d Index of Political Stability from Kaufmann et al. (1999a). 
Estimation:  Ordinary last squares estimation.
Standard errors in parenthesis.
* p<0.01; **p<0.05; * p<0.10.







VARIABLES   (1)   (2) (3)
Constant -1.36*** -1.39*** -1.37***
(0.38) (0.39) (0.39)
Circulation of Newspapers 
a  1.46***  1.44*** -0.30^
(0.50) (0.58) (1.11)
                                                  
Level of Democracy 
b  0.26*  0.10^
(0.15) (0.17)
Circulation of Newspapers  1.99*
* Level of Democracy (1.10)
Per Capita Income  0.17***  0.16***  0.17***
(Log) 
c (0.14) (0.06) (0.06)
Political Instability
 d  0.42***  0.38***  0.39***
             (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
                                                  
R-Squared 0.703  0.712  0.721
Ajusted R-Squared 0.695  0.702  0.708
Number of observations 126  117  117
a Newspaper Circulation per Person.
b Gurr Index of Democracy, rescaled from 0 to 1.
c Per Capita Income. Log of per capita GDP in $ and 1985 constant prices. Source: World Penn Tables.
d Index of Political Stability from Kaufmann et al. (1999a). 
Estimation:  Ordinary last squares estimation.
Standard errors in parenthesis.
*** p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10.







VARIABLES   (1)   (2) (3)
Constant -1.34*** -1.38*** -1.37***
(0.28) (0.29) (0.29)
Circulation of Newspapers 
a  0.49  0.41 -0.27^
(0.36) (0.43) (0.84)
                                                  
Level of Democracy 
b -0.08  0.14^
(0.11) (0.13)
Circulation of Newspapers  0.78*
* Level of Democracy (0.83)
Per Capita Income  0.18***  0.20***  0.20***
(Log) 
c (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Political Instability 
  d  0.64***  0.66***  0.67**
             (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
                                                  
R-Squared 0.849  0.849  0.850
Ajusted R-Squared 0.846  0.843  0.843
Number of observations 126  117  117
a Newspaper Circulation per Person.
b Gurr Index of Democracy, rescaled from 0 to 1.
c Per Capita Income. Log of per capita GDP in $ in 1985 constant prices. Source: World Penn Tables.
d Index of Political Stability from Kaufmann et al. (1999a). 
Estimation:  Ordinary last squares estimation.
Standard errors in parenthesis.
*** p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10.
^ In joint test with democratic institutions and per capita income, statistically significant at 0.05 level.
TABLE 4
Rule of Law23
The models in Tables 1 through 4 have strong explanatory power—the explained
variance ranges from 70 percent to 85 percent. As shown in column 1, the level of newspaper
readership has a strong impact on the overall index of quality of government, government
efficiency and the level of corruption. Newspaper readership varies from 0.7 daily copies per
person in Hong Kong to 0 in Mauritania. This difference implies 1.20 points in the quality of
government, 0.6 points in government efficiency and 1 point in the index of corruption,
amounting to two thirds of a standard deviation in the first two indexes and slightly over a whole
standard deviation in the case of  corruption.
9 Figure 1 displays the relationship between
corruption and newspaper circulation to convey the robustness of the results. By contrast, daily
newspaper circulation does not have a statistically significant impact on the level of rule of law.
This result is not surprising—the type of behavior captured by this index may be more dependent
on societal institutions and practices than on politicians’ actions.
10
                                                       
9 For a first cut on newspaper readership, turnout and quality of government, see IADB (2000). See also Brunetti
and Weder (1999) on the relationship of press consumption and corrupt practices using a cross-section of countries
in the early 1990s.
10 The daily circulation of newspapers per person is only partly tapping the degree of monitoring that citizens
exercise over public officials.  Non-written media, radio and TV, constitute a major and growing source of
information for public opinion. As far as we know, however, cross-national studies on TV exposure are not large
enough to provide data to check the impact of this mass media on institutional performance. Exposure to political
information given in radio and television may have a similar impact as newspaper circulation since, although the
impact on political information and action of total time watching TV is still debated, recent studies show that both
newspaper readership and time of exposure to TV news are correlated across individuals and increase the political
sophistication of voters (Norris, 2000).24



































































































































Democracy boosts the effectiveness and cleanliness of government as expected—
corruption declines and government effectiveness increases by about a fourth of a standard
deviation of the sample as a country moves from an authoritarian to a democratic regime (Model
2, Tables 1 to 4).
Model 3 in all four tables fits particularly well our theoretical expectations. Once we
introduce the interactive term “Circulation of Newspapers * Level of Democracy,” the level of
daily newspaper readership has a negative impact on the quality of government. As the per capita
circulation of newspapers increases, governments become less efficient and corruption goes up.
The variable is clearly  proxying for the political  mobilization that some authoritarian
(totalitarian) regimes build through the news media and that, without corresponding political
liberties, have a depressing effect on the accountability of policy-makers. Democracy still has a
positive impact on governance quality. More importantly, the interactive term shows a very
substantial effect on the quality of governments—it is statistically significant either alone (in
Tables 3 and 4) or jointly with its components (in Tables 1 and 2).
11 Figure 2 simulates the
impact of different values of press circulation and democracy on governmental effectiveness and
corruption.
12 Consider the case of corruption, shown in the bottom simulation. The difference
between an authoritarian regime with no press readership and a democratic regime with a strong
newspaper circulation amounts to 1.28 points in the level of corruption, well over one standard
deviation in the sample under analysis. The simulation also makes apparent under what
conditions inefficiency and corruption attain their maximum levels. In a country with strong
readership and no political liberties, corruption is 1.49 points higher than in a democracy with a
similar press circulation. In short, it is only the combination of a vibrant and free press that leads
to a well-served public.
13
                                                       
11 The importance of press, democracy and their interaction is not affected by the exclusion of either per capita
income or political instability.
12 These simulations are based on Models 3 in Tables 2 and 3. The values of per capita income and political
instability have been set at their means.
13 The effect and statistical significance of press circulation and democracy, alone or in interaction, do not hinge on
the inclusion of any control variables. In fact, once we drop per capita income and/or political stability, their
coefficients grew both substantively and in statistical significance.26
Figure 2. The Impact of Democracy and Newspaper Readership:
                         A Simulation
A. Level of Government Efficiency
Per capita daily circulation of newspapers
0.00 0.35 0.70
Democracy 0.00 -0.07 -0.29 -0.51
0.50 -0.02 0.04 0.09
1.00 0.03 0.37 0.70
Note: The simulation is based on Model 3, Table 2. Per capita income and political instability
have been set at their means.
B. Lack of Corruption*




0.00 -0.13 -0.24 -0.34
0.50 -0.08 0.16 0.41
1.00 -0.03 0.56 1.15
* A higher coefficient indicates less corruption.
Note: The simulation is based on Model 3, Table 3. Per capita income and political instability
have been set at their means.
In Tables 1 through 4 both the level of development and the extent of political stability
are statistically and substantively significant in a systematic manner. Economic development is
associated with better government. The effect, however, is mild. Setting all other variables at
their means, a country with a per capita income of $500 is predicted to have a corruption index
of -0.20. For a per capita income of $20,000, the corruption index should be of 0.43.
14 Two
comments are in order. First, the causal direction of the relationship is unclear; using the log
value of per capita income in 1990 is an attempt to measure the impact that development may
have on government performance rather than the other way around. Second, the result does not
clarify why, that is, through which channels, does economic development affect governance. At
least two mechanisms are conceivable. On the one hand, economic development may just be
proxying for the level of physical and human capital available to governments.  However,
regressing educational variables in the benchmark models of Tables 1 to 4 shows that human
                                                       
14 When we regress per capita income alone on any index of governmental performance, the size of the coefficient
multiplies roughly by three—this is due to a relatively good correlation between press readership and development.27
capital is not statistically significant—although it is once we exclude per capita income.
15 On the
other hand, economic development can be mostly seen as a shift from highly immobile fixed
assets to progressively more mobile capital, that is, from societies that rely on the exploitation of
mines and agricultural land to economies based on manufacturing industries and human capital-
intensive businesses. In other words, higher levels of per capita income are associated with better
governmental performance because, as the proportion of mobile assets increases (due to the
process of economic modernization), the capacity of politicians to expropriate resources (the
parameter d ) declines.
Political stability has a substantial effect on the quality of government. One standard
deviation in the level of political stability (from, say, the United Kingdom to Zambia) reduces
the overall quality index by two thirds of a standard deviation of the sample and increases the
level of corruption by half a standard deviation of the sample.
Tables 5 through 7 introduce, in turn, several control variables to assess the robustness of
our results.  Table 5 includes controls for the religious composition and legal code of each
country (models A1, B1, C1 and D1) as well for the constitutional framework (columns A2, B2,
C2 and D2). Table 6 shows controls for economic variables, that is, the size of the state, capital
controls and trade openness (columns A1, B1, C1 and D1), and the degree of electoral
mobilization (second column of each dependent variable). Table 7 displays controls for social
capital (measured through interpersonal trust). In all cases, with the exception of the first column
of Table 7, we employ the unrestricted model with newspaper readership, political regime, their
interaction, and controls for economic development and political stability. Notice that the sample
declines relative to Tables 1 to 4.
16
                                                       
15 These results are not shown in the paper. The introduction of educational controls does not erode the impact of
newspaper circulation.
16 Ethnic fractionalization has no effect on governmental performance in our unrestricted model. It dampens it,
however, when we drop the variable of political instability. Results are not reported in the paper.28
TABLE 5. The Robustness of Political Accountability Mechanisms (1). Controlling for Culture and
Constitutional Structure.
A. OVERALL QUALITY   B. EFFICIENCY C. CORRUPTION
INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES   (A1)   (A2) (B1) (B2) (C1) (C2) (D1)
Constant -1.03 -2.42*** -0.46 -1.13*** -0.73 -1.61*** -0.85**
(0.88) (0.71) (0.54) (0.41) (0.52) (0.43) (0.41)
 
Circulation  0.41^ -0.04^^ -0.36^^ -0.60^^  0.13^ -0.11^^ -0.13^^
of Newspapers   (1.67) (0.92) (1.03) (1.03) (0.99) (1.13) (0.77)
Level of Democracy a  0.40^  0.30^^  0.09^^  0.00^^  0.18^  0.04^^ -0.03^^
(0.28) (0.35) (0.17) (0.21) (0.17) (0.21) (0.13)
Circ. of Newspapers  1.35^  0.92^^  1.69^^  1.18^^  1.38^  1.08^^ 0.65^^
* Level of Democracy (1.67) (1.86) (1.16) (1.07) (1.12) (1.12) (0.87)
Political Instability     1.17***  1.11***  0.55***  0.57***  0.40***  0.38***  0.66***
(0.11) (0.14) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09) (0.05)
Per Capita Income  0.27***  0.31***  0.12**  0.15**  0.16***  0.21***  0.19***
(Log)    (0.09) (0.11) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04)
Proportion of -1.21*  -0.67* -0.38 -0.57**
Protestant Religion a (0.62) (0.38) (0.37) (0.29)
Proportion of -0.64* -0.38* -0.46** -0.38**
Catholic Religion 
a (0.33) (0.20) (0.20) (0.15)
Proportion of -0.97*** -0.44** -0.53*** -0.24
Muslim Religion a (0.33) (0.20) (0.20) (0.15)
Socialist Legal Code -1.79** -0.74* -0.82* -0.68**
(0.71) (0.49) (0.43) (0.33)
English Legal Code -0.19 -0.12 -0.04 -0.07
(0.63) (0.39) (0.38) (0.30)
French Legal Code -0.57 -0.15 -0.31 -0.28
(0.40) (0.42) (0.40) (0.31)
German Legal Code -1.20* -0.57 -0.62 -0.25
(0.68) (0.42) (0.40) (0.31)
Federalism  -0.12 -0.05 -0.15
(0.27) (0.15) (0.16)
Presidentialism   0.15  0.05  0.15
(0.11) (0.07) (0.07)
Proportional  0.03  0.07 -0.05
Representation (0.20) (0.11) (0.12)
R-Squared  0.863 0.817 0.783 0.756 0.802 0.752 0.887
Ajusted R-Squared  0.847 0.801 0.757 0.735 0.779 0.731 0.874
Number of observations  115 102 115 102 115 102 115
a Variable goes from 0 to 1.
Estimation:  Ordinary last squares estimation.
Standard errors in parenthesis.
TABLE 5. The Robustness of Political Accountability Mechanisms (1). Controlling for Culture and
Constitutional Structure.
A. OVERALL QUALITY   B. EFFICIENCY C. CORRUPTION29
TABLE 6. The Robustness of Political Accountability Mechanisms (2). Controlling for Economic Regime and
Electoral Mobilization.






VARIABLES   (A1)   (A2) (B1) (B2) (C1) (C2) (D1) (D2)
Constant -3.14*** -1.77** -1.14** -0.75 -1.77*** -1.15** -1.77*** -
1.11***
(0.92) (0.85) (0.54) (0.48) (0.58) (0.52) (0.45) (0.40)
Circulation -2.17^ -0.09^^ -1.57^ -0.78^ -1.27^ -0.17^ -0.81^^  0.03^^
of Newspapers 
  (1.87) (1.92) (1.10) (1.09) (1.17) (1.18) (0.91) (0.91)
Level of Democracy  
a  0.30^ -1.73** -0.01^ -1.15**  0.09^ -1.30** -0.21^^ -0.76*
(0.30) (0.84) (0.18) (0.47) (0.19) (0.51) (0.15) (0.40)
Circ. of Newspapers  3.61*  0.87^^  2.49**  1.25^  2.70**  1.13^ 1.45^^  0.37^^
* Level of Democracy (1.87) (1.89) (1.10) (1.06) (1.16) (1.15) (0.87) (0.89)
Political Instability 
    0.93***  1.07***  0.47***  0.50***  0.36***  0.40***  0.66***
0.66***
(0.15) (0.13) (0.09) (0.07) (0.10) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06)
Per Capita Income  0.30***  0.41***  0.13**  0.23***  0.14***  0.25***  0.19***
0.21***
(Log)  
  (0.12) (0.11) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05)
Public Expenditure  
a -0.39   0.25  1.16** -0.08
(Proportion of GDP) (0.80) (0.47) (0.50) (0.39)
Level of Capital  0.48*  0.30*  0.17  0.06
Controls (0.26) (0.15) (0.16) (0.13)
Trade Openness 0.18   0.02  0.09  0.14*
(0.17) (0.10) (0.11) (0.08)
Electoral Participation -2.24** -1.42*** -1.18** -0.55
in the 1990s   
a (0.86) (0.49) (0.53)
(0.40)
Electoral Participation  3.35**  1.82**  2.07***  1.04*
* Level of Democracy (1.29) (0.73) (0.79)
(0.30)
R-Squared  0.802 0.820 0.730 0.759 0.733 0.745 0.833  0.851
Ajusted R-Squared  0.783 0.807 0.705 0.742 0.707 0.727 0.817  0.840
Number of observations  94 103  94 103  94 103  94  103
a Variable goes from 0 to 1.
Estimation:  Ordinary last squares estimation.
Standard errors in parenthesis.
*** p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10.
^ In joint test of democracy, newspaper circulation, its interaction, statistically significant at 0.05 level.
^^ In joint test with democracy, newspaper circulation, its interaction and per capita income, statistically significant at 0.05 level.30
TABLE 7. The Robustness of Political Accountability Mechanisms (3). Controlling for Interpersonal Trust.
A. OVERALL QUALITY   B. EFFICIENCY C. CORRUPTION D. RULE OF LAW
INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES   (A1)   (A2) (B1) (B2) (C1) (C2) (D1) (D2)
Constant -3.11*** -3.25*** -1.66*** -2.02*** -1.75*** -2.29*** -1.43*** -
1.41***
(0.64) (1.15) (0.34) (0.65) (0.58) (0.64) (0.30) (0.44)
Circulation -0.18^ -7.98^^  0.64^ -3.31^^ -0.96^ -4.05^^ -0.17^ -4.41**
of Newspapers 
  (2.92) (4.98) (1.57) (2.84) (1.54) (2.79) (1.36) (1.92)
Level of Democracy  
a  2.73***  0.40^^  1.38***  0.15^^  1.40***  0.26^^  1.11^ -0.07^^
(0.69) (0.74) (0.37) (0.42) (0.36) (0.41) (0.32) (0.29)
Circ. of Newspapers  1.74^  7.38^^ -0.09^  2.68^  1.77^  3.64^^ 1.44^  4.58**
* Level of Democracy (3.66) (5.27) (1.96) (3.00) (1.92) (2.96) (1.70) (2.03)
Political Instability 




Per Capita Income  0.41**  0.27**  0.26**
 0.20***
(Log)  
  (0.18) (0.11) (0.10)
(0.07)
Proportion of Population  
a  0.06***  0.01  0.03***  0.01  0.03***  0.01  0.03***  0.00
Saying They Trust Others (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
(Average 1981,1990-91,
1995-96 World Surveys)
R-Squared  0.710 0.839 0.674 0.797 0.733 0.830 0.738  0.901
Ajusted R-Squared  0.685 0.815 0.646 0.766 0.710 0.804 0.716  0.887
Number of observations  51  47  51  47  51  47  51  47
a Variable goes from 0 to 1.
Estimation:  Ordinary last squares estimation.
Standard errors in parenthesis.
*** p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10.
^ In joint test of democracy, newspaper circulation, its interaction, statistically significant at 0.05 level.
^^ In joint test with democracy, newspaper circulation, its interaction and per capita income, statistically significant at 0.05 level.
Both economic development and political stability show very stable coefficients that are
statistically significant. Newspaper readership alone continues to depress the quality of
government. Except for the index of the rule of law, democratic regimes have a positive effect on
governance. Similarly, the interactive term has a strong positive effect on governance. Excluding
Table 7 and the first model of Table 6, the coefficients are very similar to Tables 1 to 4. We
discuss these exceptions later; let us point out here that whenever they differ from the
coefficients in Tables 1 to 4, they turn out to be substantively larger. In all cases, the coefficients
are statistically significant, either alone or in a joint test of the interactive terms and their31
components (and in some cases with per capita income). The need for a joint test derives from
the substantial multicollinearity among several regressors.
Religion does not have the theoretical effects generally claimed by the literature (Model 1
in Table 5). Protestantism actually depresses the quality of government and it does so slightly
more than Catholicism and Islam. It only delivers better results in terms of corruption.
Differences in legal codes, that LaPorta et al. (1998) take to be fundamental in explaining the
degree of state intervention and the mechanisms through which individuals protect themselves
from corrupt or rent-seeking public servants, turn out to be irrelevant (Table 5, Model 1). This is
not surprising, since LaPorta and his colleagues never specify in what particular ways legal
codes should make politicians differ in their behavior. In fact, to the best of our knowledge, there
is no aspect of Roman law that should make the public sphere more susceptible to corruption
than Common law. It is evident that the highly significant coefficient of the “socialist legal code”
is just proxying for the rather chaotic transition from planning to market economies that has
taken place in former socialist countries. The introduction of a dummy variable for former
communist countries makes the “socialist legal code” variable not statistically significant and its
coefficient close to zero—this result is not shown here.
Model 2 in Table 5 shows, in turn, that constitutional frameworks do not affect the
performance of states. A federal arrangement seems to be associated with slightly worse results,
while presidentialism may boost very marginally the quality of government. Yet none of the
three institutional variables is statistically significant.
The impact of economic policies is irregular (Table 6, Model 1). Trade openness is only
positively associated with the index of rule of law—yet even in this case the coefficient is small.
In line with the idea that capital liberalization (and hence asset mobility) disciplines states, fewer
capital controls come together with higher levels of overall quality of government and efficiency.
Finally, public expenditure only enters significantly in the corruption regression. As the
resources of the state increase, graft declines: a larger public sector reduces the incentive public
officials have to raise their salaries by illegal means (Table 6, Model C1).
More interestingly, all the models in the second column of each index in Table 6 show
that the level of electoral turnout has a considerable impact on governance. Electoral
mobilization alone, independently of the regime in place, depresses the quality of government.
The result goes in line with the effect of newspaper circulation. Without democracy, high levels32
of turnout and readership simply point to the presence of certain types of authoritarian
governments that are rather efficient at controlling and indoctrinating their population. By
contrast, as turnout increases in a democratic setting, political accountability goes up
substantially. Other things being equal, the index of lack of corruption index rises by about 0.45
points (half a standard deviation in the sample) from a country where only 50 per cent of the
population vote to a country where everybody votes. Given the existence of a slight correlation
between turnout and newspaper readership (r = .34), the variables measuring newspaper
circulation decline a bit. Still, media control of the government continues to affect governments
in a notable way.
Table 7 turns to examine the impact of social capital, measured as the percentage of
people that say people can be trusted, on governmental performance. Notice that, due to the lack
of data for a large number of countries, the size of the sample declines to about 50 nations. As
noted above, studies on social capital and its consequences on economic and political
performance fail to disaggregate, both theoretically and empirically, the micromechanisms that
make politicians perform well (Boix and Posner, 1998). One of the key goals of this paper, by
contrast, is to explore the specific channels that create political accountability. Although
interpersonal trust and newspaper readership are correlated—the Pearson’s coefficient is 0.57—
they respond to different dimensions of social and political behavior. Accordingly, Table 7
examines their separate effects through two regressions.
In the first model in Table 7, we simply report the results of adding the measure of trust
to measures of newspaper readership and democracy. Excluding government efficiency, where
the interactive term of democracy and press readership turn out to have a negligible effect (but
not the separate components of democracy and press circulation), political accountability is still
enforced through informational and electoral mechanisms. Model 1 also shows that interpersonal
trust is associated with cleaner and more efficient governments. Moving from the lowest level of
interpersonal trust (5 percent in Brazil) to the highest level (64 percent in Norway) leads to an
increase of 1.7 points in the index of corruption (not far from two standard deviations). What is
unclear, however, is the causal direction of the relationship: higher levels of trust may just be the
result of better political performance. We will return to this issue in our exploration of the
universe of US states.33
The second model in Table 7 introduces the controls of political stability and per capita
income. Newspaper readership and democracy perform in the predicted direction, although the
coefficients of newspaper readership and the interactive term double in size with respect to the
results of Tables 1 to 4. The variable of interpersonal trust now becomes statistically not
significant. The strong correlation between interpersonal trust and economic development (with
r=0.60) and between trust and political stability (with r=0.70) introduce too much collinearity.
As a result, it is hard to tell whether interpersonal trust directly affects governmental
performance or it is just the outcome of two variables, stability and economic resources, that
foster both good governance and citizens’ well-being.
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2.2. Corruption and Bureaucratic Performance Across Countries Since 1980
To date the indicators developed by  Kaufmann  et al. (1999a, 1999b) are both the most
comprehensive and the closest to passing any internal validity test among the growing number of
data that are being generated on corruption and governmental effectiveness. Their drawback,
however, lies in that they only refer to a single point in time. A stronger test of our theory
requires probing how well it travels over time. We turn to this task in this subsection.
To build a panel of data with cross-sectional and time-series observations, we rely on the
set of indicators that the Political Risk Services Group has developed since the early 1980s to
assess the political, economic and financial risks in over 110 countries, and that are published in
its “International Country Risk Guide.”  We have employed five types of indexes as our
dependent variables: “Corruption,” which taps both the demand for bribes from business by
political and administrative authorities as well as practices such as patronage, nepotism, job
reservation and so on; “Bureaucratic Quality,” which measures the institutional strength,
expertise, quality and stability of the civil service; “Rule of Law,” which includes an evaluation
of the strength and stability of the legal system as well as an assessment of the extent of citizens’
compliance; “Expropriatory Risk” of property; and “Governmental Repudiation of Contracts.”
                                                       
17 In our sample, interpersonal turst turns out to be strongly conditional on political stability and income inequality.
The regression is:
TRUST = 52.11 - 0.68** GINI COEFFICIENT + 9.85*** POLITICAL INSTABILITY
   (12.35) (0.31)           (3.44)
r
2=0.47
Standard errors in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05.
For a more extend discussion of these results and their implications, see Boix (2000).34
The first three indexes range from 0 to 6. The latter two go from 1 to 10. A higher number
indicates a government that is cleaner, more efficient and less threatening to private property.
Our theoretical expectations are that the impact of democracy and information should be
strongly positive in reducing corruption and the quality of bureaucracy and then decline as we
move into the other variables. Since rule of law measures the stability and legitimacy of the legal
system, it should be positively associated with democracy; the effects of newspaper circulation
are, however, ambiguous. Finally, our theoretical model does not make any predictions on the
risk of expropriation and the possibility that governments may repudiate contracts. Constitutional
democracies should dampen the  expropriatory threats and time-consistency problems that
characterize authoritarian regimes vis-à-vis property owners (Olson, 1993). But universal
suffrage democracies also give the poor the best chance to socialize the means of production.
The impact of newspapers may well be negative: a higher circulation may imply a more
mobilized electorate and thus stronger redistributive demands.
Due to our data for newspaper readership, which is only available for 5-year intervals,
and to eliminate the year-to-year variability in the data due to mistaken evaluations, we have
averaged the data in five-year periods (1982-84, 1985-89, 1990-94, and 1995-98). The dependent
variable is then regressed on daily newspaper circulation, democracy, the interaction, and the log
of per capita income (market value and constant 1995 dollars). The daily newspaper circulation
data corresponds to the initial year of each 5-year period, that is, to 1980, 1985 (in this case an
average of the years 1980 and 1990), 1990 and 1995. The democracy index is taken from Polity
III, re-scaled to the range 0 to 1, and averaged for the periods 1980-84, 1985-89, 1990-93 and
1993-94 (this is the last year of the Gurr dataset). The estimation of the pooled cross-sectional
time-series model is done through ordinary least squares, adjusting the standard errors for
unequal variation within panels and correcting for autocorrelation.
18
                                                       
18 For a discussion of the appropriateness of this specification, see Beck and Katz (1995). The models have also been
estimated using a random-effects specification, a fixed-effect model to account for potential idiosyncratic effects for
different countries, and then change rather than level of the parameters. Results are extremely robust to these
different specifications and can be obtained from the authors.35
   TABLE 8. Quality of Government and Political Accountability:











(A1) (A2) (B1) (B2) (C1) (C2) (D1) (D2)
Constant  0.99**  0.82***  -1.62**  -0.66**  -0.29  0.21 2.52***  1.46***




 0.68*** 0.59***  0.70***  0.78***




 2.07** 0.46^ -1.26^ -0.98** 1.96* 0.27 0.66^ 0.20^^




0.62*** 0.22** 0.23^ -0.05^  0.66***  -0.02 1.75*** 0.46*




1.50*  0.76^ 3.27*** 1.73***  0.25^ 0.01 -1.03^ -1.24^^
* Level of
Democracy
 (0.80) (0.55) (0.98)  (0.44) (0.99) (0.14) (1.09) (0.86)
Per Capita
Income
0.22*** 0.01 0.61*** 0.28*** 0.43*** 0.14***  0.53***  0.11
(log)  (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.13) (0.07)
R-Squared  0.873. 0.974 0.899 0.965 0.865 0.963 0.823  0.980
Wald
chi-quared
286.08  1395.02 718.67 1936.91 340.22 1 388.48 139.09 955.84
Number of
obs.
 405 301  405 301 405  301 4 02 3 01
a Variable goes from 0 to 1.
Estimation: Ordinary last squares estimation, panel corrected standard errors, ar-1 autocorrelation.
Standard errors in parenthesis.
*** p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10.
^ In joint test of democracy, newspaper circulation, its interaction, statistically significant at 0.01 level.
^^ In joint test of democracy, newspaper circulation, its interaction , statistically significant at 0.05 level.36
Table 8 reports the results for corruption, bureaucratic quality, rule of law and risk of
expropriation. Results for governmental repudiation of contracts are not included—they are
similar to those for risk of expropriation. We report results with and without the lagged
dependent variable (columns 1 and 2 of each dependent variable respectively).
Results for corruption are strongly in line with our model. Total explained variance is
over 87 per cent in the first model and 97 per cent in the second one. Democracy increases the
chances of having a clean government. The daily circulation of newspapers, alone and in
interaction with democracy, is positively correlated with the lack of corruption. According to
Model A1, the sum of these two variables implies that they explain over one and a half standard
deviations in the level of corruption—and close to one in Model A2. Per capita income has a
very modest impact on levels of corruption: moving from a per capita income of $500 to one of
$20,000 implies 0.8 points in the index of lack of corruption; this is not far from our estimates
for the cross-section of countries in subsection 2.1, given the standard deviation of corruption in
that sample.
The quality of bureaucracy is also affected by both political regime and the information
flow. Democracy has a small impact on the civil service. Newspaper readership fits very well our
predictions: newspapers alone depress the quality of government. But, in interaction with
democracy, they certainly boost governmental performance. Simulating Model B1 shows that
whereas in an authoritarian regime with high media circulation the index of quality of
bureaucracy would be 2, in a democratic regime with high media circulation it should climb up
to about 4.6, other things being equal.
The import of democracy and media circulation decline substantially for all other
measures of performance. Press and democracy affect positively the index of rule of law in
Model C1. Their effect disappears, however, once we introduce the lagged value of rule of law.
19
Democracy has a dissuasive impact on the temptation policymakers may have to expropriate
property owners. But a democratic setting with high levels of newspaper reading seems to pose a
potential threat to property, at least if we are to believe the subjective perceptions that form the
basis of the surveys of PRS.
                                                       
19 In the equation with first differences, press and democracy have negative signs. By contrast, the change in the
interactive term of press and democracy has a positive effect on the change of rule of law.37
As noted above, all these results should not surprise us. They actually reinforce the
validity of the political accountability model presented in this paper. A higher level of political
accountability translates into cleaner and more effective governments. But it may say nothing
about whether citizens will comply with the law. And it certainly does not affect what policies
citizens demand and governments pursue toward redistribution and private property. In other
words, our model is not getting good empirical results merely because we are looking at different
components of a well-functioning political system in which all kinds of “good behavior” cluster
tightly together. On the contrary, the impact of political accountability varies across different
dimensions of political life. It is fundamental to reduce corruption and increase administrative
efficiency. But it does not necessarily color the character of substantive policies.
20 The strength
of our estimations resides in that they are able to discriminate among different questions
(corruption, performance, degree of state intervention) and models in quite a precise manner.
3.  Corruption in US States
The validity of any theory ultimately hinges on how well it travels across different universes of
cases. So far, we have tested our political accountability model on both a cross-section and a
panel data of world states. We turn now to explore its implications as well as its robustness on
the universe of US states—that is, in not fully sovereign political units. If the model is correct,
higher levels of political participation and higher levels of political information and transparency
should lead to more disciplined, less corrupt politicians.
To test our theory in the US, we examine the underlying causes of political corruption in
the American states. The measure of political corruption is the number of public officials in each
state who have been convicted for violating laws against public corruption per one hundred
elected officials in that state. To eliminate random variations in yearly data, we employ the total
number of convictions for two separate periods, 1977-1987 and 1986-1995. The data, gathered
by the US Department of Justice’s Public Integrity Section, has been collected and reported by
Meier and  Holbrook (1992) and  Schlesinger and Meier (2000). During the first period of
                                                       
20 The differences in the explanatory value of democracy and newspaper circulation are the more robust given how
relatively well correlated the different PRS indexes are. For example, the lowest Pearson’s coefficient of correlation
between any of the five indicators is 0.63 (the one between corruption and expropriation of risk). The highest, the
one between expropriation of risk and repudiation of contracts, is 0.88. The remaining correlation coefficients
fluctuate around 0.75.38
analysis, the average state had 1.69 convictions per one hundred elected officials, and the
standard deviation was 1.71. The number of convictions ranged from 0.03 in North Dakota,
Kansas and Vermont to 5 or more in Alabama, Maryland and South Carolina. In the period of
1986-1995, the number of convictions experienced an increase: the average was 2.12 with a
standard deviation of 2.35. The number of convictions increased in thirty-nine states and now
spanned from 0.1 in New Hampshire and Vermont to over 8 in Florida and Virginia. The
universe of cases is 49 (data for Hawaii are not reported in Schlesinger and Meier, 2000).
We examine the causes of variation in corruption in two ways. First, we estimate our
model in a cross-section of the average of both periods. Second, we estimate a panel of the two
periods using the same procedures discussed above. Results are reported in Table 9. Both models
in Table 9 include the variables that are statistically significant: daily circulation of newspapers
per person in 1983 and 1995; level of turnout in the presidential elections of 1976, 1980, 1992
and 1996; the log value of per capita income in constant dollars of 1995 for the years 1985 and
1995; the audit capabilities of the states, measured by the number of computer facilities available
to the state legislature; and the index of social capital as developed in Putnam (2000). The daily
circulation of newspapers is taken from the  Statistical Abstract of the US, which gives the
number of newspaper copies published in each state, and then adjusted, with data directly
obtained from the major newspapers, to reflect actual readership in each state.
21 The newspaper
circulation per person varies from 0.17 to 0.36 in 1983 (with a mean of 0.26 and a standard
deviation of 0.05). In line with a fall in political participation and associational life (Putnam,
2000), it has dropped in recent years to a range from 0.12 to 0.30 (and a mean of 0.21) in 1995.
The level of turnout and per capita income are also taken from the Statistical Abstract of the US.
Data on audit capabilities is given by Meier and Holbrook (1992). The index of social capital is a
summary measure built through factorial techniques using data on interpersonal trust,
associational life and political participation (Putnam, 2000).
                                                       
21 As a result of this adjustment process, the daily newspaper circulation per person drops from 0.35 to 0.26 in New
York and from 0.39 to 0.12 in Virginia (where major papers are printed) while increasing slightly in many other
states. The data on New York is only partially adjusted since data on sales by state were not made available to us by
the New York Times; this leads to an overestimation of the number of newspapers read in New York. Results do not
change, however, even when we exclude this observation.39
Total variance in the models in Table 9 is high and the coefficients are very stable. The
results show that the number of convictions declines by 3.5 (about one and half standard
deviations in the panel data) if we move from the lowest to highest levels of newspaper
circulation. Exactly replicating the results obtained in Table 6 above (Model 2), the level of
electoral participation has a strong impact on corruption. Turnout in presidential elections varies
from 40 to 70 per cent approximately (the mean is around 55 per cent). Accordingly, increasing
TABLE 9.  Corruption in US States: Number of Prosecutions of Public Officials per 100 Hundred
Officials, 1977 to 1995








 (5.37)  (3.42)








 d  0.09**   0.09**
(0.04) (0.04)
Social Capital Index 
e -0.38 -0.57**
(0.42) (0.24)
                                                  




of observations  48   96
a Newspaper Circulation per Person. Data for 1983 and 1995.
b Level of turnout in presidential elections of 1976, 1980, 1992 and 1996.
c Per Capita Income. Log of per capita GDP in 1995 constant prices.
d Computer Facilities Available to Legislature. Source: Meier and Holbrook (1992).
e Index of social capital developed in Putnam (2000).
Estimation:  Ordinary last squares estimation. For panel, panel corrected standard errors.
Standard errors in parenthesis.
*** p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10.
TABLE 9.  Corruption in US States: Number of Prosecutions of Public Officials per 100 Hundred
Officials, 1977 to 199540
participation to the highest rate in the sample reduces the number of convictions by 3.7. The
impact of per capita income is small. The number of computer facilities per legislature has a
small but positive (rather than negative as we might have expected) impact on corruption. The
impact of social capital, that is, the existence of institutionalized structures of cooperation, is
ambiguous. It is only significant in the panel analysis.
22
An introduction of a time variable in the panel data estimation leads to a very small
(-0.15) and statistically not significant coefficient. We are tempted to conclude from this last
result that the increase in the level of corruption from the first to the second period is neither a
randomly determined effect nor a consequence of improved federal resources, but rather that it is
directly tied to the decline in both newspaper readership and electoral participation that had taken
place over time and that we have shown to be the key mechanisms to exact good behavior from
politicians.
The models we report in Table 9 have been subjected to a long battery of controls—the
results are not included since coefficients for those variables are not statistically significant.
Controls include resources in the hands of the federal government (measured through federal
attorneys per 100 population, federal judges per 100 population and backlogged federal cases),
social characteristics of the state population (percent of urban population, college graduates and
percent with a high school degree or higher), degree of party competition (measured as the
difference between the first and second parties in elections), type of party organization
(measured through the index of “traditional party organization” reported by Mayhew, 1986 and
ranking party state organizations by how well they fit the ideal type of an autonomous, stable,
hierarchical, centralized organization capable of controlling nominations and mobilizing
sympathizers and voters), institutional characteristics of states (appointment power of the
governor, state centralization measured by percentage of state and local employees who are
employed by the state government, number of special districts as a percent of all government
units, proportion of the electorate that must sign petitions to activate procedures for recall,
referendum and initiative), ideology of the state (using the liberalism index developed by Wright,
                                                       
22 An analysis of the separate impact of each of the components of the index of social capital shows that purely
associational measures (such as number of organizations per capita, attendance to club meetings, etc.) do not explain
levels of corruption. Corruption declines with both higher levels of interpersonal trust and participation in politics.
In the former variable, the causal direction probably flows from corruption to trust. The latter type of variable,
measured through number of people attending local meetings and number serving as officers in organizations, is, as41
Erikson and McIver and modified by Meier and Holbrook, 1992, to include Alaska and Hawaii),
campaign reporting requirements (defined as the number of groups or types of individuals
required to file campaign finance statements) and size of public budget and state bureaucracy
(measured through number of government employees per 1000 inhabitants, mean salary of state
employees, ratio of public budget to employees, and public tax revenue per capita).
23 Newspaper
circulation and turnout are especially robust to the introduction of these control variables. Per
capita income becomes statistically not significant when measures of urban share of the
population and educational level are introduced in the regression. In turn, once we drop per
capita income, the variables measuring education levels, urban population, and proportion of
public employees become significant: the first one reduces corruption; the latter two increase it.
4.  Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have explored the causes that underlie the wide variation in government
performance and corruption we still observe today across the globe. Our explanation is relatively
straightforward. How well any government functions simply hinges on how good citizens are at
making their politicians accountable for their actions. The types of tasks modern states have to
accomplish force citizens to hand over massive resources and discretionary powers to
policymakers. This process of delegation, however, is likely to jeopardize the welfare of citizens.
Politicians may be tempted to exploit the lack of information that voters may have about policies
and their consequences either to pursue their own agenda or to appropriate part of the public
budget. Thus, it is only when citizens effectively discipline policymakers to serve them that
public goods are delivered in an efficient manner and corruption is curtailed.
The political control of public officials turns out to depend on two key factors. First, free
and regular elections allow citizens to discipline politicians—the credible threat of losing office
in the next period compels policy-makers to respond to the voters’ interests. Second, and equally
important, the degree of information of citizens curbs the opportunities politicians may have to
engage in political corruption and mismanagement.  Governmental performance improves as
citizens have more precise knowledge on both the policies adopted by politicians and the
environment in which they are implemented, provided that competitive elections are in place to
                                                                                                                                                                                  
a matter of fact, tapping the political accountability mechanisms we have already uncovered in the course of the
paper.42
punish the incumbent. As shown in the paper, the presence of a well-informed electorate in a
democratic setting explains between one half and two thirds of the variance in the levels of
governmental performance and corruption. This result is robust to the type of indicator, the time
frame and the universe we employ. It explains well why corruption is rampant in sub-Saharan
Africa and Russia yet close to non-existent in Canada, Central and Northern Europe or New
Zealand. It accounts for the impressive cleanliness of American states in the Plains as well as for
the much higher level of federal indictments of public officials in the South of the USA.
A well-informed and politically mobilized electorate matters more than the level of
economic development to ensure good government. Per capita income is correlated, although
only mildly, with better performance for two reasons. First, the impact of per capita income
partly reflects the fact that richer nations have more resources. Second, it proxies for the ways in
which the structure of the economy, both in terms of the mobility of factors and the diversity of
economic sectors, may constrain politicians. Our results on the positive impact of financial
liberalization on performance provide, in fact, some indirect evidence on the disciplining effect
that giving more exit options to citizens may have on public officials.
In the last decade, civil society has been resurrected as a main variable to explain the
political and economic vibrancy of nations. To some extent, newspaper readership and electoral
competitiveness are part and parcel of any “strong” society. But civil society is too broad a
concept to have real analytical leverage: one of the goals of the paper has been to delimit more
effectively what mechanisms serve to control politicians. The paper shows that strong
cooperative patterns and higher levels of interpersonal trust may matter—the evidence is rather
mixed for the world sample and close to non-existent for the American states once we control for
participation and information levels. But overall it is the presence of politically active and
sophisticated electorates that does the job of generating better politicians.
Having the proper mechanisms to enforce political accountability reduces to a marginal
role most of the remaining potential variables entertained by the current literature. Neither the
structure of the legal system nor any specific religion appears to affect the performance of
government. Ethnic conflict has no direct effect on institutional performance—although it may
indirectly, since it fosters political instability, which in turn depresses the quality of government.
Variations in the type of constitution—in the electoral system, degree of political centralization
                                                                                                                                                                                  
23 Most data have been taken from Meier and Holbrook (1992) and from the Statistical Abstract of the US.43
or legislative-executive relations—do not alter the behavior of politicians. This last result should
only in part be read as rebuttal of the growing favor that neoinstitutional models are finding
among political economists. Our sense is that governmental performance hinges more on the way
in which the linkage between voters and politicians is structured or institutionalized than on the
constitutional framework in place. As of now, however, we do not have the right type of cross-
national indicators to measure the extent to which politicians and voters are connected by
clientelistic or any other kind of relationships. This points out the lines of research we should
work on in the future. We need to explore what types of linkages connect politicians and voters
in different countries and party systems as well as the ways in which they impair or increase
government’s accountability. Similarly, we should pay more attention to the conditions that
generate the kind of mobilized democracies that lead to good government.44
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